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Why do governments fail to implement policy commit-
ments in contractual agreements with international orga-
nizations? While scholars have scrutinized domestic
factors as obstacles to compliance, we argue that reform
programs may be unimplementable by design. We study
this hypothesis in the context of International Monetary
Fund (IMF) programs, in which borrowing countries
must commit to far-reaching economic policy reforms
for access to credit. We collect detailed compliance data
on individual policy conditions to assess the determi-
nants of compliance failures of IMF programs from 1980
to 2009. Controlling for a host of borrower-specific vari-
ables, features of the loan, unexpected shocks during
implementation, donor influence, and bureaucratic inter-
est, we find that the number of conditions is a robust
predictor of implementation failure. Our theoretical
explanation for these findings is that over-ambitious pro-
gram designs are the result of intra-organizational
bargaining within the IMF bureaucracy. While an area
department within the IMF drafts the initial reform pro-
gram, functional departments use their amendment
power to include policy conditions that they care about,
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without due consideration of local circumstances, which
leads to over-ambitious programs. These findings have
important implications for theories of compliance as well
as for policymaking in international organizations.
1 | INTRODUCTION
Lack of compliance with international commitments is widespread—not only for international
agreements between governments, like the Paris Agreement or human rights conventions, but also
for contractual agreements between international organizations and individual states (Chayes &
Chayes, 1993; Findley et al., 2013; Hathaway, 2002; Tallberg, 2002; Underdal, 1998). One promi-
nent example is implementation failure of borrowing countries with policy conditions of the Inter-
national Monetary Fund (IMF), an international organization mandated to uphold global financial
stability and provide loans to countries in economic trouble. The ability to tie disbursements to the
fulfillment of conditions makes the IMF one of the most powerful international organizations
(Stone, 2004; Vreeland, 2003); yet, its ability to compel actual policy reform in borrowing countries
remains limited (Abbott et al., 2010; Haggard & Kaufman, 1992; Rickard & Caraway, 2019). Non-
compliance with policy conditions is problematic for at least four reasons: first, it can undermine
the borrowing country's ability to achieve macroeconomic stabilization (Nsouli et al., 2004); sec-
ond, it can weaken market confidence in borrowing countries, thereby intensifying economic
instability (Bird, 2002, pp. 838–839; Edwards, 2005; Mody & Saravia, 2006); third, it raises transac-
tion costs by causing frequent re-negotiation of program content; and, fourth, it generates opportu-
nities for donor influence and staff discretion in decision making, potentially thwarting program
effectiveness (Dreher et al., 2015; Mecagni, 1999; Pop-Eleches, 2009; Stone, 2004).
Past scholarship examining the determinants of compliance failure has focused on country-
specific factors, as well as unforeseen events in the global economy (Bird, 2002; Joyce, 2006;
Stone, 2004). In contrast, we scrutinize the role of program design as an overlooked determi-
nant of compliance. Introducing a new data set on compliance with IMF conditionality between
1980 and 2009, we argue that most IMF programs are unimplementable by design: they include
too many and excessively complex conditions that cause compliance failures, in turn requiring
the IMF to scale back on its ambitions in subsequent program reviews. Indicatively, of all
668 programs approved between 1980 and 2009, 371 programs were interrupted due to compli-
ance problems, and 241 of these never resumed. In this article, we examine the determinants of
permanent interruptions of IMF programs. Controlling for alternative explanations such as the
initial macroeconomic environment, political circumstances, and the evolution of these factors,
we find a significant positive relationship between program failure and the number of condi-
tions set at the beginning of the program.
To explain these results, we draw on documentary evidence and semi-structured interviews
to develop a theoretical framework that conceives the IMF as a collective agent within which
several departments have a stake in program design. Any new program—designed by the rele-
vant area department—can be amended by functional departments, which champion particular
policies that they consider critical to the achievement of wider objectives. Functional depart-
ments can include “pet” issues in loan agreements without facing significant barriers because
staff collectively prefer to avoid arbitration of disagreements by senior IMF leadership.
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Meanwhile, IMF management and the Executive Board often do not monitor staff closely
enough to reign in extensive conditionality. Borrowing countries accept over-ambitious pro-
grams to obtain much-needed IMF credit, while in many cases anticipating renegotiation or for-
giveness on unmet conditions.
Our study contributes to scholarship on the policies and politics of international organizations,
notably the IMF, which has received persistent attention in the literature. We demonstrate how
entrenched bureaucratic structures inside the organization and the associated lending practices
affect borrowing-country compliance. Our claim that IMF staff exercise major influence over design
of conditionality conforms with constructivist works emphasizing the normative predispositions of
staff, organizational culture, and the preference for ideological consistency (Barnett &
Finnemore, 1999; Broome & Seabrooke, 2007; Chwieroth, 2014; Momani, 2007; Nelson, 2017). Yet,
unlike these scholars, we shift attention to non-unitary rational actors involved in the intra-
organizational bargaining process over the design of programs. In stressing such problems within a
singular organizational structure, our argument is also distinct from those emphasizing collective
action problems among several organizations participating in program design of bailouts
(Chwieroth, 2014; Lütz et al., 2019). We therefore offer further support to the argument that organi-
zational routines of international public bureaucracies affect the success of their policy interventions
(Barnett & Finnemore, 1999). Finally, our study responds to calls for more reliable data and methods
(Bird &Willett, 2004; Breen, 2014; Vreeland, 2006): we present a novel data set on program interrup-
tions that we subsequently merge with publicly-available data on conditionality. Our data on inter-
ruptions extends existing sources—notably, the IMF's Monitoring of Fund Arrangements
database—with respect both to the number of programs and time frame covered. We therefore
advance earlier research restricted to proxies of compliance (Arpac et al., 2008; Dreher, 2003;
Edwards, 2005) and provide convincing tests of our hypotheses. While we are not the first to use pro-
gram interruptions as implementation measure, our large-N analysis covers more programs and a
longer time horizon and offers methodological advances over past small-N research (Mecagni, 1999).
2 | DETERMINANTS OF IMF PROGRAM COMPLIANCE
While the design of IMF programs is commonly understood as the outcome of an unequal bar-
gain between the Fund and its borrowers, compliance with such programs can be modeled as a
decision-making problem by the borrowing government. In a simple cost–benefit framework,
a government will comply as long as the marginal benefits exceed the marginal costs from
doing so (Bird, 2008; Joyce, 2006; Stone, 2002). The standard explanation for non-compliance in
this framework is that—as a program evolves—circumstances become less favorable than ini-
tially anticipated. An adverse shock may cause governments to fail to implement certain condi-
tions even if they intended to comply at the point of agreeing to them (Bird, 2002).
One type of adverse shock relates to domestic political constraints, which often manifest in
the form of anti-reform preferences of special interest groups (Coate & Morris, 2006;
Drazen, 2002; Mayer & Mourmouras, 2005). Past research found that program interruptions are
significantly related to the number of veto players (Arpac et al., 2008), and program disburse-
ments often get interrupted before elections (Dreher, 2003). Another driver of non-compliance
are economic shocks, such as a global financial crisis or declining terms of trade (Bird, 2008). To
upset program implementation, shocks must not already be factored into program design. For
instance, democratic governments often secure IMF programs with fewer conditions to begin
with, given the anticipated domestic opposition to policy reforms (Caraway et al., 2012). This
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suggests that the IMF anticipates potential implementation failures by designing programs that
provide incentives for countries to comply with them.
In reality, however, asymmetric information may prevent IMF staff from identifying a pro-
gram that respects these constraints (Mayer & Mourmouras, 2005). Non-compliance may occur
where the net benefits of continuing an IMF program from a borrower perspective have become
negative, while from the perspective of IMF staff they are still positive. Such situations may
occur because borrowers do not internalize the positive externalities of crisis resolution beyond
their borders. For example, while the IMF takes into account compliance-related benefits such
as global financial stability beyond the program country, an individual country does not internal-
ize these benefits but faces the full costs of adjustment (Joyce, 2006). In addition, the Fund does
not fully anticipate political constraints. Our own interviews—in addition to internal evaluation
reports and NGO briefs (BWP, 2018; IEO, 2018; IMF, 2018)—suggest that the Fund underesti-
mates domestic political challenges to its conditions, with increased protests, government insta-
bility, and compliance failure as a result (Auvinen, 1996; Dreher & Gassebner, 2012; Ortiz &
Béjar, 2013).1 As a result, economic fundamentals and other characteristics of borrowing coun-
tries can affect program failure, even though program design is conditioned upon them.
Turning to empirical work on the determinants of program implementation, our analysis is
closest to a landmark comparative case study of 36 Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility
programs in 1986–1994 (Mecagni, 1999). This study examined the reasons underlying all
51 identified cases of program interruptions: “policy slippages” (33 cases); government break-
down that made it impossible to continue the program (10 cases); and forward-looking dis-
agreements with the Fund over reform schedules (8 cases). Further interrogating policy
slippage cases, Mecagni (1999, p. 221) found that these were due to political events, economic
shocks and natural disasters, but not program design and insufficient monitoring. The role of
these factors was confirmed in subsequent studies—summarized in the Supporting Information
(Appendix Table A1). While often using different proxies for program implementation, they
also find that high debt, low exports, large loans, and political polarization at program onset
adversely affect program implementation (Arpac et al., 2008; Joyce, 2006; Killick, 1995).
While previous scholarship offers a useful point of departure to understand variation in
compliance with IMF programs, it has two shortcomings. First, it has understood non-
compliance mostly due to changing circumstances outside the control of IMF staff and borrow-
ing governments, and due to failure to accurately assess risks, thereby neglecting endogenous
sources of program failure. Related empirical work has often relied on limited country samples,
specific types of programs, and short timeframes, thereby limiting the generalizability of its
findings. Second, previous scholarship on compliance conceives the Fund as a homogenous
actor, thereby overlooking sources of non-compliance related to intra-organizational disagree-
ments. In the next section, we address these shortcomings by presenting a new argument
linking program design to compliance failure.
3 | A NEW HYPOTHESIS: UNIMPLEMENTABILITY
BY DESIGN
While previous work has studied bargaining processes between the Fund and its borrowers over
IMF programs, the internal processes affecting their design have been largely neglected. In fact,
the process by which new IMF programs are agreed involves several stages and is relatively
rigid. It begins with an area department preparing a blueprint, which is then circulated to the
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functional departments, which can amend it. A revised blueprint is submitted to IMF manage-
ment for clearance, after which an IMF mission enters into negotiations with the country. Any
tentative agreement is again subject to approval by functional departments and ultimately the
Executive Board, which triggers disbursement of the first credit tranche (Mussa & Savastano,
2000). A program then enters the implementation stage, where countries are subject to periodic
review by IMF staff who assess whether the country has met all relevant conditions so that the
next loan tranche can be released. If a borrowing country fails to meet a critical condition, the
IMF Board can waive it so that the review is completed. Failure to complete the review leads to
program interruptions and suspension of loan disbursements (see Supporting Information,
Appendix A for a detailed description, and Box 1 for a glossary of key terms).
BOX 1 Glossary of key terms
Program design
Binding conditions: Policy conditions that a borrowing country must implement in
the agreed time period. Binding conditions include prior actions, structural perfor-
mance criteria, and quantitative performance criteria. Failure to implement a binding
condition delays the program review and interrupts the program.
Nonbinding conditions: For these policy conditions, which include indicative targets and
structural benchmarks, no waiver is required if they have not been met. Judging whether
sufficient progress has been made on their implementation is at the discretion of IMF staff.
Program implementation
Program reviews: A monitoring mechanism whereby IMF staff periodically assess the
progress of the borrower against agreed-upon reform measures. For a review to be com-
pleted, the borrower must be found to have implemented all binding conditions (and
all unmet conditions must have been waived). The frequency of reviews differs by lend-
ing facility. For example, SBAs are reviewed quarterly, whereas EFFs are reviewed
every 6 months. If the IMF staff cannot complete a review within the given review
period, the respective program review is delayed and the program is interrupted.
Waivers: If a borrower fails to implement a binding condition, the IMF staff may rec-
ommend to the Executive Board to grant a waiver on that condition. The Board grants
waivers on an ad hoc basis.
Program interruptions: A program is interrupted if its review is not completed by the
test date. The schedule of test dates depends on the type of loan facility. There are two
types of program interruptions, corresponding to two scenarios following a delayed review.
A temporary interruption occurs if the country gets back on track, possibly after
renegotiating the schedule of conditions. A permanent interruption occurs if the program
does not resume. Both interruptions imply that the borrower loses access to IMF funding.
Sources: IMF, 2001a; Mecagni, 1999; Mussa & Savastano, 2000; Nsouli et al., 2004.
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This short primer demonstrates that different IMF departments are involved in the process
of program design. These departments have different preferences over program design, espe-
cially its overall level of ambition and the sets of issues included as policy conditions. The area
department, represented by the mission chief, is the interlocutor with country authorities and
thus has a better understanding of local circumstances. In contrast, functional departments—
specifically, Strategy, Policy, and Review (SPR)—take a global view, often pushing for more
ambitious targets and more conditions in IMF programs regardless of local circumstances. In
an IEO survey on programs in fragile states, government representatives from Iraq attested that
“the area department was more sympathetic to [their] situation than were the functional
departments, which tended to be more rigid and to take an abstract view of what was achiev-
able in Iraq with less understanding of local political context” (Takagi et al., 2018, p. 62).2
Given these preferences, conflicts between area departments and functional departments are
inevitable. Asked about the internal coordination process on draft programs, a former mission
chief explained: “There are disagreements about how fast adjustment can happen or about the
need for conditions at all […] SPR is usually harsher than the country unit.” Such disagreements
are likely resolved by stepping up the ambition of a program because “staff want to avoid involv-
ing IMF management—it is not good for their reputation.”3 Likewise, staff surveyed by IEO
stated that “the internal incentive system rewarded toughness more than realism, and that
negotiating a program with ambitious objectives and few departures from the mission brief
smoothed the internal review process considerably, whereas attempts to be realistic and accom-
modative of [borrower] concerns—legitimate or not—did not” (IEO, 2002, p. 136). Thus, area
departments will usually accommodate pressures from SPR for more ambitious programs.4
An observable implication of this process is that IMF programs are unimplementable by
design: they will have extensive conditionality that even a well-intended government may not
fully implement under favorable circumstances. This is obvious when considering that exten-
sive conditionality is a result of the amendment power of functional departments. Narrative evi-
dence that IMF programs have over-ambitious conditionality abounds (Baqir et al., 2005; Bird,
2005; Bird & Willett, 2004), although none of these studies analyzes the implications of this
practice systematically. Referring to the 1994 program of the Philippines, an Independent Eval-
uation Office review stated: “[T]he IMF was simultaneously pushing for reforms to the oil-
pricing system and to tax policy, each of which required congressional approval, as prior actions
for the completion of program reviews. In the view of some staff, this may have been over-
ambitious, exceeding the capacity of the political system to digest several major reforms at the
same time” (IEO, 2002, p. 162).5
Even IMF management does not deny its programs suffer from unrealistic expectations. For
example, a former staffer explained that “though the expansion of structural conditionality was
a largely appropriate response to changing circumstances, there is a sense that we may have
gone a bit too far,” asking for “too much, too soon” (Dawson, 2003). Likewise, in its condition-
ality review, the IMF stated that “conditionality may have been established on policies that
were unlikely to be delivered, calling into question the realism of program design” (IMF,
2001a).6 It has also recognized the dangers of over-ambition for country compliance and socio-
economic outcomes, given that “conditionality covering a broad range of policy areas may also
place an enormous burden on limited administrative capacities in borrowing countries and may
make it more difficult to focus on getting the most important things done” (Ahmed et al., 2001).
The same study also warns “that conditionality that is unrealistically ambitious […] may result
in repeated failure to meet agreed targets and foster a culture of nonperformance.” Thus, our
main hypothesis is:
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Hypothesis 1. The more conditions a borrowing country needs to implement in a given pro-
gram, the greater the likelihood of implementation failure.
Why do governments sign onto over-ambitious programs? One explanation is that countries
have limited influence on the agreement's terms, given they need credit to combat a crisis.
However, even if they cannot influence these terms, they may find it rational to agree on over-
ambitious terms. Countries are aware that programs are unrealistic and (rationally) anticipate
implementation problems with some conditions, which the IMF may likely waive at a later
stage (Pop-Eleches, 2009). A condition waiver is a decision by the Board to lift the requirement
for the country to implement a given condition (see Box 1). This renders the net benefits from
program participation positive again. The evidence is consistent with this argument: for
instance, reflecting on a loan to Indonesia that contained 117 conditions, the IMF's official his-
torian commented that “obviously, nobody expected Indonesia to fulfill all 117 of these prom-
ises. It was impossible, and everybody recognized it was impossible” (IMF, 2001b). The
Indonesian case seems to reflect a general policy approach. Timothy Geithner—then-director of
the predecessor of SPR—asked almost rhetorically: “Has the Fund been too tough or too accom-
modating? Or [...] has it been both, by setting unrealistic aspirations for policy reform and then
acquiescing to the inevitable failure of even relatively well intentioned governments to meet the
bar? There is something to this” (Goldstein et al., 2003, p. 442).
Why do IMF management and the Executive Board apparently fail to control over-
ambitious program design by IMF staff? A straightforward explanation is they lack in-depth
knowledge to judge whether programs are feasible. A less benign view is that in most cases they
do not (sufficiently) care. A former mission chief explained that “management usually signs off
without many questions asked—unless it is an important program.” Once signed off by man-
agement, Board approval “is […] perfunctory, [as it] will only care about big programs, like
Greece,” while rubber-stamping most staff proposals.7 In general, institutional reforms seeking
to curb the inflated use of conditionality among IMF staff, like the 2002 “Streamlining
Initiative,” were not particularly effective.8 An IEO review stated that although the scope of
conditionality narrowed, “there was little evidence of an actual reduction in the number
of structural conditions” (IEO, 2004, p. 64); and more recent evidence shows the number of
structural conditions remained high (Kentikelenis et al., 2016).
The final puzzle we address is why departments involved in program design do not internal-
ize the costs of implementation failures. In fact, staff may suffer little reputational loss from
designing over-ambitious programs that fail during implementation. A former mission chief
confirmed that “the loss in reputation [from failure] is actually small,” explaining further that
“internally we do not play the blame game—unless a staff member is found guilty of serious
misconduct.”9 One interviewee said “SPR is [like] Teflon.”10
In sum, we hypothesize that extensive conditionality increases the likelihood of implemen-
tation failure, reflecting the notion that IMF programs are unimplementable by design. The sub-
sequent section presents our research design.
4 | RESEARCH DESIGN
Our data cover 668 programs from 1980 to 2009 and is at the country-program level.11 Our
empirical approach is to use well-defined observational models in which we test for a relation-
ship between program design and implementation failure, controlling for a host of alternative
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explanations, such as macroeconomic fundamentals, unexpected economic shocks, and political
dynamics.
4.1 | Main variables
4.1.1 | Implementation failure
While implementation failure can be measured in different ways, we argue that program inter-
ruptions are the most pertinent measure of implementation problems because they only occur if
a borrower fails to implement critical policy conditions and the Fund decides not to waive
them—that is, program interruptions occur when programs are seriously off-track. Among the
measures discussed below and given data limitations, program interruptions are most suitable
for our analysis.
To identify interruptions, we rely on a newly-compiled data set on IMF program review
dates, which we used in conjunction with previously available data on IMF conditionality
(Kentikelenis et al., 2016). We coded as interruptions those cases where scheduled reviews were
not completed or completed with delay. A program review is delayed if there is a time lag
between the initially agreed-upon review date and the actual review date, which vary by
funding facility (Ivanova et al., 2001; Mecagni, 1999; Nsouli et al., 2004). For a Stand-By Agree-
ment, a program review is delayed if it is not concluded within 90 days, while for an Extended
Fund Facility, (Enhanced) Structural Adjustment Facility, or Poverty Reduction and Growth
Facility program, it is delayed if not concluded within 180 days.12 If a program review is never
completed, the program becomes permanently interrupted. As there are more than one reviews
in each program, a program may be both temporarily interrupted and permanently interrupted,
although this co-occurrence is rare in practice.13
Our main dependent variable is PERMANENTLY INTERRUPTED—a binary indicator of whether an
IMF program got permanently interrupted. This is the case if a scheduled review was never com-
pleted. For programs that are canceled and replaced with another, we did not count non-
completed reviews as interruptions if the subsequent program commenced within 90 days of a
Stand-By Agreement review date or 180 days of an Extended Fund Facility, (Enhanced) Structural
Adjustment Facility, or Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility review date. In robustness tests,
we use a more encompassing definition of program failure that also includes temporary interrup-
tions.14 Temporary interruptions occur if programs get off-track but ultimately resume after the
Fund and the borrower have renegotiated the agreement. Our alternative outcome variable—ANY
INTERRUPTION—thus takes a value of one if a program has at least one kind of interruption.
Program interruptions as dependent variable are preferable over several alternatives, listed
in the Supporting Information (Table A2). Two measures of implementation failure are at the
level of conditions. The MONA database records for each program condition an IMF staff
assessment of whether it was implemented (Arpac et al., 2008). This information can be aggre-
gated at the program level to obtain the number of unmet conditions as a measure of implemen-
tation failure. The main drawback of the MONA database is its short coverage, from 2002 to the
present, which makes it inappropriate for our purpose. Another indicator of implementation
deficits are waivers, which refers to decisions by the Executive Board releasing borrowers from
the need to implement a condition that they failed to implement.15 Waivers are less appropriate
for our purposes as they are typically granted in the presence of mild implementation problems.
Furthermore, the number of waivers is not a pertinent indicator of non-compliance because a
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country might be non-compliant even without waivers, notably when its program is inter-
rupted. Finally, waivers are better understood as an intervening variable—a tool to avert pro-
gram failure once a borrower has failed to meet a critical condition. Given that waivers are an
instrument to avert program failure, we include them as a control variable.16
A remaining alternative used by early studies on compliance is the disbursement ratio—the
amount of funds drawn down by the recipient in relation to the originally committed funds—as
a measure of compliance. A low disbursement ratio—typically below a threshold of 75%—may
indicate non-implementation of essential targets. While Killick (1995) considers disbursement
ratios of entire IMF programs, Dreher (2003) proposes a refinement that considers the percent-
age of funds left undrawn in any program year, assuming equal-size tranches. However,
disbursement-based measures are too noisy proxies of compliance because countries may not
need to draw on the funds; for example, if economic circumstances have improved. We there-
fore discard this measure for our analysis and use program interruptions hereafter.
In line with previous work, we find IMF program interruptions are surprisingly common
(Mussa & Savastano, 2000, p. 94). Our data show that of all 668 programs during 1980 and
2009, 371 were interrupted, and 241 never resumed. In other words, 56% of all programs
became interrupted over their lifetime, of which 28% had at least one temporary interruption
and 36% were permanently interrupted, as shown in Table 1.17
4.1.2 | Program design
Our primary predictor relating to program design is the total NUMBER OF CONDITIONS. It captures the
overall depth of conditionality and hence the ambition of the program (Dreher, 2009; Dreher &
Jensen, 2007; Stone & Steinwand, 2008).18 In robustness checks, we also consider the SCOPE OF CON-
DITIONALITY—the number of different issue areas in an adjustment program—as a proxy for pro-
gram complexity (Stone, 2008). For all these measures, we only consider binding conditions, since
implementation failure interrupts scheduled disbursements of IMF loans (Copelovitch, 2010). As
conditions may be carried over to subsequent program years, we only consider conditions in the
first year of the program, thereby mitigating concerns about reverse causality.
4.2 | Control variables
Considering both borrowing-country variables at program initiation and exogenous changes in
the environment during program implementation, we probe five sets of control variables.19
TABLE 1 Program interruptions
(1980–2009)
Total number Percentage
All programs 668 100%
Interrupted programs 371 56%
… Permanently interrupted 241 36%
… Temporarily interrupted 189 28%
Note: The set of programs excludes programs that cannot be interrupted, for
example because they do not include conditionality. A program can have
both types of interruptions.
REINSBERG ET AL. 9
First, in terms of economic variables, we include (logged) PER-CAPITA INCOME, GDP GROWTH,
CURRENT ACCOUNT BALANCE, FOREIGN RESERVES, and DEBT SERVICE in percent of GNI (Arpac et al.,
2008; Dreher, 2003; Pop-Eleches, 2009). The data for these variables are taken from the
World Development Indicators. In addition, we control for changing economic circumstances
in the global economy and the borrowing country, which may render initially agreed pro-
grams unviable (Bird, 2008). Considering the global financial environment, we include the
percentage change in the U.S. INTEREST RATE given that re-financing becomes more difficult
under higher U.S. rates. Data are from the Global Financial Development Database. At the
country level, we include a dummy indicating a FINANCIAL CRISIS (Laeven & Valencia, 2013),
as well as percentage changes in standard macroeconomic variables that the Fund closely
monitors—CURRENT ACCOUNT BALANCE, RESERVES, and DEBT SERVICE as of GNI—calculated from
the World Development Indicators.
Second, borrowing countries' domestic political characteristics may equally affect program
design as well as implementation failure (Dreher, 2003; Joyce, 2006; Pop-Eleches, 2009; Stone,
2004). We include the POLITY IV index to measure democratic institutions (Marshall et al.,
2010), the veto player index as a measure of POLITICAL CONSTRAINTS (Henisz, 2002), a binary indi-
cator of LEFT-WING GOVERNMENT ideology (Beck et al., 2001), and an index of STATE CAPACITY
(Hanson & Sigman, 2016). To capture changes in political characteristics, we include measures
of the absolute difference in the POLITY IV score, the percentage change in POLITICAL CONSTRAINTS,
dummies for EXECUTIVE ELECTIONS and LEGISLATIVE ELECTIONS (Beck et al., 2001), and the incidence
of CIVIL WAR during program implementation (Gleditsch et al., 2002).
Third, we control for donor influence, given that salient borrowers for influential share-
holder countries may obtain better deals while at the same time expending less effort to
comply with conditionality (Breen, 2013; Copelovitch, 2010; Dreher & Jensen, 2007; Stone,
2002). Well-established measures of donor interest include a binary indicator of temporary
UN SECURITY COUNCIL MEMBERSHIP (Dreher et al., 2015), UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY VOTE ALIGNMENT
with the United States (Bailey et al., 2015),20 and (logged) G5 BANK EXPOSURE (Copelovitch,
2010). Furthermore, we include (logged) ODA PER CAPITA to eliminate aid catalysis as a poten-
tial confounder, from the World Development Indicators. We measure all these variables at
program initiation.
Fourth, we control for the IMF lending history of the borrowing country (and its peers),
given the possibility for organizational learning from past failures.21 We control for lending
relations using the variables FIRST BORROWER—a binary indicator for the first program of a given
country with the Fund—and PAST FAILURE—a binary indicator of any permanently interrupted
program in the past 5 years. We also allow for the possibility that IMF staff learn from past fail-
ures from similar programs. We therefore include PAST PEER FAILURE, defined as the percentage of
all permanently interrupted programs over the past 5 years that were managed by the same area
department and that benefited countries in the same concessional bracket.
Finally, we control for additional dimensions of the IMF program, specifically the origi-
nally agreed PROGRAM DURATION in months and the LOAN TO QUOTA ratio (Arpac et al., 2008;
Bird, 2008; Nsouli et al., 2004). Importantly, we control for the percentage of WAIVED CONDI-
TIONS as waivers are intended to mitigate the risk of program failure. We obtained data on
waivers by tracking the relevant Board decisions at all program reviews.22 To account for
global trends that apply to all borrowers alike, we include decennial period dummies.
Finally, we include regional dummies to control for heterogeneity across area departments.
Data sources and descriptive statistics for all variables can be found in the Supporting Infor-
mation (Table A3).
10 REINSBERG ET AL.
4.3 | Methods
As our dependent variable is binary, we estimate probit models. The main drawback of such
models is that they do not allow for the inclusion of country-fixed effects, known as the “inci-
dental parameters” problem (Greene, 2011). Using fixed effects has the advantage of eliminating
unobserved heterogeneity across countries, although the sample available for such analysis only
includes countries with at least two programs. We use conditional logit models with country-
fixed effects in robustness checks. In all cases, we compute robust standard errors clustered on
countries.
We initially proceed under the assumption of exogeneity. This obviously overlooks the
potential problem of reverse causality. In our case, however, reverse causality would work
against our hypothesized relationship. For example, it might be the case that IMF staff reduce
program ambition to avoid compliance failures—beyond a level that would be justified by
observable measures of initial conditions and changing economic circumstances.
Another source of bias may arise from omitted variables that render our findings spurious.
To use a classic example, “political will” is unaccounted for by the Fund when designing a pro-
gram but affects country compliance (Vreeland, 2003). To mitigate such sources of bias, we
adopt an instrumental-variable design. Following recent methodological advances (Stubbs
et al., 2020), we use a “compound instrument” that identifies the differential effect of the num-
ber of conditions on program failure between borrowers likely to face many conditions versus
those likely to face few conditions, controlling for covariates (Dreher & Langlotz, 2015). Specifi-
cally, we interact the number of countries under programs in the start year of a given program
with the average number of program conditions for a given country over the sample period
(Reinsberg et al., 2019). For the “excludability restriction” to be violated, there would need to
be a variable predicting the number of program countries over time and differentially across
countries with different general exposure to IMF conditions, which we consider to be highly
unlikely. While diagnostic tests lend support to this claim (Figure B1), we also probe robustness
of our findings to alternative instruments. Since we include the constituent effects of the com-
pound instrument, we effectively control for global common shocks like a global financial crisis
that might increase the number of IMF borrowers, as well as country-specific time-invariant
effects related to the average burden of conditionality.
5 | RESULTS
5.1 | Correlational analysis
We find strong support for our hypothesis that over-ambitious program design leads to imple-
mentation failure (Table 2). Across all five models—corresponding to different sets of control
variables—an increase in the number of conditions by one standard deviation is estimated to
increase the likelihood of a permanent interruption by at least 2.4%. This effect is statistically
significant (p < .05). While these findings are not to be interpreted causally, the robustness of
the correlation is striking, providing a first indication that IMF programs are unimplementable
by design.
A look at the control variables generates interesting insights on the remaining determinants
of permanent interruptions. Condition waivers are negatively related to program failure. Other
characteristics of the adjustment loan have no effect, except that programs benefiting low-
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income economies have a marginally higher risk of failure. In terms of economic factors, low
and declining levels of reserves and a deteriorating current account balance increase the likeli-
hood of permanent interruptions. Neither domestic political factors, international political fac-
tors, nor bureaucratic factors are significantly related to program failure.
5.2 | Instrumental-variable design
Instrumental-variable analysis corroborates our main hypothesis (Table 3), producing coeffi-
cient estimates that are substantively larger and statistically significant. We find that the num-
ber of conditions robustly increases the likelihood of permanent interruptions. In substantive
terms, based on the first model, an increase in the number of conditions by one standard devia-
tion increases the likelihood of a permanent interruption by at least 11.5%—roughly half a stan-
dard deviation (p < .05).
Control variables change little compared to previous estimations. As the instrumental-
variable design entails an additional equation for the number of conditions, it also produces
interpretable findings on their determinants—itself an under-researched issue despite notewor-
thy exceptions (Copelovitch, 2010; Dreher et al., 2009; Dreher & Jensen, 2007). We find the
compound instrument is moderately strong, with a Kleibergen-Paap F-statistic above ten
(Stock & Yogo, 2005). We also find that longer programs tend to include more conditions
already at program start, but a country that draws a larger portion of its quota (surprisingly)
receives fewer conditions, which tends to be true also for low-income countries. In addition, the
coefficients of economic fundamentals are consistent with expectations that programs include
more conditions when the country must serve higher debt repayments. Turning to the political
system, we find that countries where veto players mobilize and that suffer from civil war can
expect lower conditionality. Among international political factors, higher G5 bank exposure
(surprisingly) predicts more conditions, which could indicate that this variable proxies need for
safeguards rather than political favoritism. Higher foreign aid available at the start of the pro-
gram also predicts more conditions, for the same reason. Finally, first-time borrowers obtain
significantly fewer conditions, while past permanent interruptions in the same region and
income group tend to reduce program ambition.
5.3 | Mechanisms
Which mechanism underlies our finding that extensive conditionality leads to program failure?
We argue that extensive conditionality is the result of the amendment power of IMF functional
departments. Unfortunately, this mechanism is not directly testable in a large-N framework
because there is no variation in the program design process. A potential remedy is to consider
cases in which IMF policymaking departs from ordinary procedure.
To probe the plausibility of our collective-agency mechanism, we conduct split-sample anal-
ysis of the previous system of equations scrutinizing cases of elevated donor interest and IMF
management oversight, where the relationship between program design and implementation
failure would be weaker.23 We consider two relatively simple proxies. The first is an annual
measure of preference heterogeneity of the G7, which is computed as the coefficient of variation
over the G7 ideal point estimates based on voting patterns in the UN General Assembly (Bailey
et al., 2015). According to principal-agent theory (Nielson & Tierney, 2003), key shareholders








































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































REINSBERG ET AL. 17
are less able to effectively control the IMF staff when their preferences are divided, which
should give the IMF staff greater leeway to impose extensive conditionality.24 We indeed find
evidence of unimplementable IMF programs only when G7 preferences are relatively heteroge-
neous (Table A4). Our second test uses observable variation in the approval time of IMF pro-
grams. IMF management has discretion over which loans to schedule for approval by the
Executive Board. It uses this discretion to accelerate loan approval for borrowers that it deems
important (McDowell, 2017).25 The observable implication is that our collective-agency mecha-
nism should be driven by ordinary loans, with approval time above the median (Table A4). This
is indeed what we find. Overall, these results provide some suggestive evidence for our
collective-agency mechanism.
While our tests of the collective-agency failure mechanism are far from perfect, we do not
find compelling evidence for alternative mechanisms. For example, extensive conditionality
could reflect the preferences of powerful donors in the Executive Board. However, our own
interviews, IMF documents, and previous research suggest that the Board is (more) lenient
when it comes to program design (Bird & Willett, 2004). In a recent follow-up survey on the
Streamlining Initiative, two-thirds of the Executive Directors said that conditionality could be
more focused; and several of them expressed concern that the number of structural conditions
and pace of structural reforms frequently overwhelmed country authorities, particularly in frag-
ile states (IEO, 2018, p. 13). Other scholars emphasize that bureaucratic self-interest drives pro-
gram design (Babb & Buira, 2005; Dreher & Vaubel, 2004; Vaubel, 2006). The IMF bureaucracy
might be interested in mandating extensive conditionality because doing so provides it with
increased discretionary authority to subsequently waive conditions (Eichenbaum, 2000).
Prompted with this alternative, a staff member considered this a “far-fetched explanation.”26
Our interviewees also refuted that extensive conditionality is the result of “rational
overshooting,” whereby IMF staff impose more conditions than they expect borrowers to imple-
ment, whereas borrowers anticipate that IMF staff will waive unmet conditions. The fact that
program interruptions are reputationally costly for recipients, for instance through increased
refinancing costs, makes this argument unconvincing.
Overall, our results are consistent with our argument that extensive conditionality leads to
implementation failure. Our core finding withstands different sets of control variables and esti-
mation methods. Our posited relationship does not hold if donors have salient interests in the
borrower and for loans that are important for IMF management. In both cases, political masters
have high-powered incentives to rescue such borrowers, for instance through waivers of condi-
tions that break the link between over-ambitious design and program failure.
5.4 | Robustness tests
In the Supporting Information, we probe the robustness of our findings in several ways. First,
we use ANY INTERRUPTION as our dependent variable, thus defining program failure in broader
terms than before (Table A5). Our results are qualitatively unchanged: a higher number of ini-
tial conditions is positively related to the likelihood of interruption. Control variables behave as
before, except that an upcoming legislative election is now significantly negatively related to
interruption.
Second, we use an alternative operationalization of our key predictor (Table A6). Specifi-
cally, we use the scope of conditionality, which reflects the complexity of a program in terms of
the number of distinct policy areas in which the IMF requires reforms to be implemented
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(Stone, 2008). Our core results are robust for both kinds of interruptions and across estimation
methods: increased scope is significantly positively associated with program interruptions. Our
positive findings on condition scope are consistent with the notion that over-ambitious design
is a result of powerful functional departments that manage to include their favorite issues into
programs.
Third, we control for nonbinding conditions, which may be related to the number of bind-
ing conditions while at the same time facilitating compliance because missing them does not
automatically suspend the program (Table A7). We find that the inclusion of nonbinding condi-
tions does not affect the relationship of interest for binding conditions. Whether nonbinding
conditions directly affect program failure depends on the estimation method. If they reach sta-
tistical significance, their estimated effect is negative, which is consistent with the notion that
nonbinding conditions have become increasingly popular with IMF staff to promote nonessen-
tial reforms in a flexible manner.27
Fourth, we use a conditional logit model with country-fixed effects. This is possible because
many countries are repeat borrowers, with several IMF programs during the sample period,
which allows us to control for unobserved confounders using fixed effects. In particular, fixed
effects help eliminate the potential confounding effect of weak institutions as a joint determi-
nant of extensive conditionality and program interruptions. In the models with endogeneity
correction, we estimate a linearized outcome equation. Across various specifications, we obtain
a robust positive relationship between the number of conditions and program failures
(Table A8).
Fifth, we use two alternative instruments for the number of conditions. The first is the aver-
age number of conditions in all programs in the same region beginning in the same year. The
intuition is that the IMF staff may compare countries under programs to similar peers and
therefore prescribe a similar set of policies to countries within the same region (Broome &
Seabrooke, 2007). A plausible micro-level process underpinning this argument is that the same
staff are responsible for designing programs in the same region. The second instrument—in line
with a world-polity approach—assumes that IMF staff follow global scripts in policy advice that
they try to replicate in all countries alike (Kentikelenis & Seabrooke, 2017). We find both instru-
ments to be strong predictors of the number of conditions, and results are qualitatively similar
(Table A9).
Sixth, we verify that it is not the prevalence of specific kinds of policy conditions causing
compliance failures. To this end, we sequentially include condition counts for issue areas such
as public-sector reform, privatization of state-owned enterprises, price liberalization, external
sector liberalization, financial sector reform, fiscal policy, institutional reform, and revenue
measures (Table A10). Political economists and our IMF interviewees conceive most of these
areas as controversial and therefore liable of causing program failure on their own (Haggard &
Kaufman, 1992; Painter, 2005; Rickard & Caraway, 2019; Waterbury, 1992). While none of these
affect our core result, we find that revenue measures reduce the risk of temporary interruptions,
while price liberalization conditions and institutional reforms increase the likelihood of perma-
nent failure.28
Finally, though suffering from reliability issues and short coverage, we replicate our main
result using the number of unmet conditions as proxy for implementation failure, after aggre-
gating relevant information for the conditions in a given program from the MONA data set.
Data limitations restrict the analysis to the 2002–2009 period. Because the short time period
does not allow us to run instrumental-variable regressions, we conduct two-way linear fixed
effects regressions. We find a robustly positive association between the number of conditions at
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program start and the total number of unmet conditions over the program lifetime
(Table A11).29
6 | DISCUSSION AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS
The design of an IMF program is a coordination problem among IMF departments. While
area departments design blueprints that try to accommodate local circumstances, the effective
veto power of functional departments—especially, Strategy, Policy and Review (SPR)—leads
to programs with ambitious targets and broad conditionality. Unless vital interests are at
stake, both IMF leadership and the Executive Board rubber-stamp loan programs, while bor-
rowing governments accept them given their immediate benefits in terms of fresh credit and
the expectation of obtaining waivers for unmet conditions. As a result of this process, we posit
that IMF programs contain extensive conditionality that makes them unimplementable by
design.
We tested this hypothesis using a data set of 668 programs from 1980 to 2009 and
established that the number of conditions in an IMF program is robustly positively related to
the likelihood of program failure. Our findings withstand a battery of robustness tests and con-
tinue to hold when addressing potential endogeneity of conditionality. By emphasizing that
most programs are unimplementable, our argument challenges existing views positing imple-
mentation as the norm, but not for unexpected negative shocks causing compliance problems
that require modification of programs and granting of waivers (Joyce, 2006). While we find that
IMF staff consider a wide array of observable characteristics—macroeconomic circumstances,
domestic politics, global factors, and expected future realizations of all these variables—for ini-
tial program design, they fail to internalize the detrimental effects of their own intra-
organizational bargaining, rendering programs unimplementable even for well-intentioned
recipients.
While our explanation for over-ambitious program designs is inherently unobservable, our
evidence is consistent with it in showing that the relationship between program design and
implementation failure does not hold precisely when the vital interests of political masters are
at stake, notably when borrowers are important to major donors or IMF management. In these
cases, centralized oversight can remedy decentralized collective-agency failure. Yet, a weaker
link between program design and implementation failure may also be bad news in the sense
that borrowers anticipating lenient treatment become less faithful in implementing IMF condi-
tions altogether, even when facing fewer conditions to begin with.
Before discussing avenues for future research and implications of our research, we note two
limitations. First, some aspects of the compliance process remain unobserved. In particular, we
do not know the exact set of conditions that governments failed to implement. Future research
should take a disaggregated approach by examining variation in compliance with specific types
of conditions. A disaggregated approach may be attractive for researchers willing to examine
which sets of conditions are more demanding to borrowing countries in terms of implementa-
tion (Polak, 1991; Vreeland, 2006; Babb & Carruthers, 2008). Another promising avenue for fur-
ther inquiry concerns the politics of waivers. While the presence of waivers implies that the
government must have failed to implement the respective conditions, many unimplemented
conditions remain unwaived. Under which conditions does the Fund decide to waive condi-
tions? In this regard, it would also be important to study more closely the relationship between
various compliance decisions. For instance, waivers—if granted exhaustively to cover non-
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implemented conditions—can avert program interruption. But when does the Fund waive all
conditions in full, and when does it only waive some conditions?
A second limitation is that our results identify the overall relationship between the depth of
conditionality and program failure across all countries. Future research could take a case-based
approach to process-trace the mechanisms underpinning over-ambitious program designs lead-
ing to implementation failure. While program interruptions are valid measures of implementa-
tion failure, they do not convey information about their causes. Although typically occurring as
a result of failure to meet conditions, they can also be due to extraneous events, such as admin-
istrative delays or changes in political leadership.30 Qualitative research could provide further
insights into the mechanisms of program failure. With regard to temporary interruptions, there
is also limited research into what factors help programs get back on track once they have been
interrupted (Stone, 2004).
Future research should assess the relative weight of different explanations for extensive con-
ditionality in IMF programs. We favor our collective-agency explanation because it makes few
assumptions about preferences of relevant actors, interpreting extensive conditionality as the
outcome of interactions among different departments with different incentives. While our pre-
liminary tests provide support for the collective-agency mechanism, the evidence was weaker
for other explanations, such as a hawkish Board, a general IMF staff preference for extensive
conditionality, or the possibility of rational overshooting, whereby IMF staff impose more con-
ditions than they expect recipients to implement and recipients accepting extensive conditional-
ity knowing that IMF staff will waive unmet conditions. Yet, further research would be
necessary to definitively pin down causal mechanisms.
Turning to wider implications, our research emphasizes policy design as a determinant of
compliance overlooked by pertinent IR accounts of compliance. We posit a theoretical mecha-
nism explaining why compliance is often poor, emphasizing internal fragmentation, coupled
with rigid processes and misguided incentive structures within international organizations,
rather than “lack of will” among recipient countries. Here, we draw on aid effectiveness
research which has long noted that “donor fragmentation” may undermine effectiveness. To
the best of our knowledge, no study has considered how internal fragmentation within interna-
tional organizations undermines the effectiveness of their interventions.
Responding to calls to improve our understanding of the determinants of compliance with
IMF policy prescriptions (Vreeland, 2006), our article uses new data and advanced methodology
to explore this issue. Our results have implications for policymakers who aim to enhance the
effectiveness of conditional lending assistance. If non-interruption is indeed crucial for program
success (Mecagni, 1999), it would be important to reduce the incidence of program failure. A
policy recommendation consistent with our analysis is to reduce the number of conditions and
the complexity of programs. While it is difficult to say when there are “too many” conditions,
reducing conditionality is beneficial for most countries, even though there may be cases where
this strategy is ineffective. We therefore agree that “merely cutting back on the number of con-
ditions would not in itself guarantee better implementation” (Mecagni, 1999, p. 238)—for that
must be complemented with technical assistance and confidence-building measures for inves-
tors. The Fund should seize opportunities for ex ante modifying program design and program
monitoring to help improve implementation (Mecagni, 1999, p. 238). Where over-ambitious
program designs are the result of coordination failure among individual departments, member
states need to strengthen the veto power of those parts in the IMF bureaucracy that articulate
the collective interests of the Fund and its borrowing countries. Ultimately, organizational
reform is an important first step to enhancing the effectiveness of IMF lending.
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1 Interview #3. In responding to the 2018 IMF conditionality review, the Executive Board noted that IMF pro-
grams would underestimate the political difficulties related to implementation, further stressing “the need for
more realistic implementation timetables and estimates of reform payoffs” (IMF, 2018, p. 3).
2 Our interviewees confirm this, stating that “SPR is harsher than the country unit[s]” (Interview #1) and
that “area departments are softer than SPR as IMF staff are going ‘native’” (Interview #2). Philip Alston,
UN Special Rapporteur on human rights and extreme poverty, argued “The Fund has consistently under-
estimated the importance of calibrating their recommendations to the specific political context, not taking
into account the extent to which recommendations are politically viable and socially sustainable” (BWP,
2018, p. 2).
3 Interview #1. Another interviewee reported that disagreements are not uncommon, occurring in about 25%
of all programs (Interview #2).
4 This is likely because SPR is more powerful, and the source of this power is its global knowledge and accu-
mulated experience. As an interviewee confirmed: “SPR is the depository of knowledge; [the] area depart-
ment may frequently defer to them” (Interview #2).
5 One NGO interviewee attested that “over-optimism is embedded” (Interview #4), further citing how IMF
chief economist Olivier Blanchard acknowledged that fiscal multipliers were wrong.
6 More recent internal evaluations suggest that this problem has persisted, despite efforts to stem
it. Responding to the results of the 2018 IMF conditionality review, Board members “saw scope for better tai-
loring and streamlining program objectives and structural conditions, particularly for fragile and small states,
in light of their economic circumstances and capacity constraints” (IMF, 2018, p. 5). One NGO interviewee
attested that IMF staff has become more aware about political difficulties to program implementation, albeit
only in recent years (Interview #5).
7 Interview #1. We acknowledge the possibility that the Board does not need to exercise tight control because
IMF staff will take the preferences of important Board members into account when designing the program.
Albeit not the focus of our analysis, we test this argument through our first-stage regressions on the determi-
nants of program conditionality in the instrumental-variable setup and do not find significant associations of
geopolitical variables and the number of program conditions.
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8 Indeed, as stated in an Executive Board response to the 2018 IMF conditionality review, such change “would
require a change in culture, and continued adaptation and learning” (IMF, 2018, p. 5).
9 Interview #1.
10 Interview #2.
11 The program is the observation unit but we consider dependencies across programs within a given country by
clustering standard errors on countries.
12 These are the typical review intervals used by the IMF. They are common knowledge to all parties and hence
it is clear that if the borrower does not meet all binding conditions by the due date, the IMF staff cannot com-
plete a review. Until a review is completed, it is delayed, and the next loan tranche cannot be released.
Reviews therefore are important “test dates” over the program lifetime (IMF, 2001a).
13 Fifty-nine out of 668 programs feature both kinds of interruptions. 371 programs feature any interruption.
14 While programs may be temporarily interrupted more than once during their lifetime, we only consider the
first interruption and record the year in which it occurred, discarding subsequent temporary interruptions.
This serves to mitigate potential endogeneity bias.
15 Waivers only exist for binding conditions. In contrast to nonbinding conditions, failure to implement binding
conditions will suspend loan disbursements (IMF, 2001a).
16 Despite waivers having the expected negative relationship with program failures, their inclusion does not
affect the main results.
17 These figures are consistent with previous research based on much shorter time series (Bird, 2002, p. 838;
Ivanova et al., 2001, p. 7).
18 Note that by counting the conditions we implicitly assign equal weight to them. This is unavoidable if we want
to maintain replicability as attempts to code the substantive importance of conditions would introduce
subjectivity bias.
19 If the program was not interrupted, we measure changes between the year of program initiation and the year
in which it was concluded. If it was interrupted, we consider changes between initiation year and the year in
which the review that caused the interruption was scheduled.
20 Results are similar for vote alignment with the G7 or including both alignment variables (Table A13).
21 A 2005 IMF Managing Director report implies the theoretical possibility for such learning, arguing that “[p]
arsimony must a guiding principle of conditionality for all client countries, not just those with a history of sub-
mitting to [the] IMF” (IMF, 2005, p. 6).
22 A necessary limitation due to data availability is that counting waivers (as we do) abstracts from the burden a
condition carries, given that waivers reflect not only non-implementation of a condition but also partial or del-
ayed implementation.
23 We prefer the split-sample approach over multiplicative interaction models as it avoids functional form mis-
specification and preserves the sanctity of the instrumental-variable design.
24 The unconditional effect of preference heterogeneity is insignificant, which refutes the argument that exten-
sive conditionality is driven by a divided principal itself.
25 Ultimately, an important borrower may be one which is of geopolitical interest to major IMF donors, which
makes shorter approval a fuzzy signal of management attention.
26 Interview #1.
27 Interviewee #1 highlighted the strategic value of nonbinding conditions, which do not need to be waived if
not met, thus allowing programs to be kept alive.
28 This is consistent with anecdotal evidence: price liberalization—as demanded by the IMF—is politically very
costly, as the fall of regimes in the Arab Spring over the lifting of food price subsidies has shown (Interview
#5). Our interviewees also mentioned political instability following elimination of fuel subsidies
(Interview #4).
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29 We also coded program disbursements from the IMF web site. We find that the number of conditions is a
robust predictor of whether a program has undrawn funds (Table A12), confirming our main results.
30 Interviews suggest that most interruptions are “bad interruptions”—caused by bad design, bad policy deci-
sions, and lack of commitment.
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